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Abstract—Cloud computing improves utilization and flexibility in allocating computing resources while reducing the infrastructural costs.
However, in many cases cloud technology is still proprietary and tainted by security issues rooted in the multi-user and hybrid cloud
environment. A lack of secure connectivity in a hybrid cloud environment hinders the adaptation of clouds by scientific communities that
require scaling-out of the local infrastructure using publicly available resources for large-scale experiments. In this article, we present
a case study of the DII-HEP secure cloud infrastructure and propose an approach to securely scale-out a private cloud deployment
to public clouds in order to support hybrid cloud scenarios. A challenge in such scenarios is that cloud vendors may offer varying
and possibly incompatible ways to isolate and interconnect virtual machines located in different cloud networks. Our approach is
tenant driven in the sense that the tenant provides its connectivity mechanism. We provide a qualitative and quantitative analysis of a
number of alternatives to solve this problem. We have chosen one of the standardized alternatives, Host Identity Protocol, for further
experimentation in a production system because it supports legacy applications in a topologically-independent and secure way.
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1 INTRODUCTION
COMPUTATIONAL clouds are not new to the scientificcomputing community. Over the past few years this
community has very well understood the benefits of this
concept by transforming their applications to virtualized
service offerings at a rapid pace. The benefits include
easier and faster deployment of scientific applications,
and the use of public cloud offerings for rapidly scaling
out services.
A hybrid cloud employs both a private and public
cloud for rapid deployment of services. This is crucial for
computationally demanding applications which require
expedited scalability at global scale. As such hybrid
clouds represent an opportunity for scientific applica-
tions as well. Organizations temporarily scaling-out their
infrastructure from a private to a public cloud during
peak hours, primarily have an economic advantage by
eliminating any upfront cost for new hardware, and
secondly reducing any administrative overhead with
new resources introduced.
Scientific applications are inherently complex and of-
ten have dependencies on legacy components that are
difficult to provide or maintain. Thus, existing scien-
tific applications should be virtualized in a backward-
compatible way. In addition, utilizing hybrid clouds
represent additional challenges, such as interoperability
between different cloud vendors. The interoperability
aspects include portability of virtual machines, cross-
vendor connectivity between virtual machines, and se-
curing of computation, data and networks. In this paper,
we touch “the tip of iceberg” and make some of the
challenges more explicit, and show an approach for
running virtualized scientific applications in a hybrid
cloud setting. Our main contribution is in the design,
implementation, evaluation and analysis of the proposed
solution using a highly challenging scientific application
that requires legacy components and secure connectivity
in a distributed environment. The scientific application
is a high energy physics grid software bundle that we
have virtualized and ported to an OpenStack production
environment.
The proposed security architecture is based on the
already standardized Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [1].
However, instead of its typical client-to-server deploy-
ment model, we deploy it for server-to-server commu-
nications to minimize unnecessary deployment hurdles
at the client side. To be more precise, we employ HIP
only for intra and inter-cloud Virtual Machine (VM)
communication to tackle some of the network security
challenges related to hybrid clouds. The suggested ap-
proach can be incrementally deployed by the tenants
independently of the cloud provider, in private or com-
mercial cloud offering such as Amazon EC21.
This work has been conducted under the Datacenter
Indirection Infrastructure for Secure HEP (High Energy
Physics) Data Analysis (DII-HEP) project. The presented
infrastructure delivers a production-ready cloud-based
platform for Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS)2 data anal-
ysis. The site DII-HEP(CMS) is part of the CMS collabo-
ration and has been providing services for more than a
year. HIP based security framework is a recent extension
that allows us to scale-out the CMS computing infras-




The live status can be viewed from Advanced Resource
Connector (ARC) site.
The presented empirical measurements help to quan-
tify our approach. As practical results, we show that
the proposed solution, HIP, offers a very similar per-
formance as the de-facto TLS/SSL. Furthermore, the
HIP-based security does not require any changes at the
application level, and it is feasible to use HIP inside
a cloud stack without intervening in the underlying
complex network configuration.
Contributions: The key contributions of this paper include:
1) Applicability analysis of HIP for a computationally
demanding scientific application;
2) Design and development of a system architecture
for a secure cloud infrastructure and a scaling-out
mechanism for the local infrastructures;
3) Experimental evaluation of the proposed architec-
ture to evaluate the applicability of HIP for secure
cloud communication for scientific computing.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3
describe the design constraints and proposed solution
for enabling scientific applications on clouds; Section 4
examines the components used in deploying our cloud
solution; System architecture is discussed in Section 5;
Section 6 presents the architecture of hybrid clouds;
Experimental setup and results are presented in Section 7
and 8 respectively, followed by a security review of the
architecture in Section 9; Finally, Section 10 highlights
our conclusions and future directions.
2 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS AND CON-
STRAINTS
The ultimate goal of this work is to be able to run virtu-
alized scientific applications in a hybrid cloud setting. In
order to meet this goal, we divide it into smaller require-
ments that will be later referred by their number (marked
as REQx). We argue and enumerate the requirements so
that our qualitative contributions become more clear, and
also try to set up a base line for other researchers to
improve the state of the art.
As the first requirement, the overall solution should be
completely based on open-source software (REQ1). This way,
repeating of the experiments is easier and vendor lock-in
can be avoided by the scientific community.
In order to virtualize a scientific application to the
cloud, two different approaches could be taken: legacy or
cloud native application virtialization. In the former ap-
proach, a legacy application is merely encapsulated into
a virtual machine image to be executed by a hypervisor
or in a Linux container in an Infrastructure as a Service
(IaaS) type of environment. In the latter approach, an ap-
plication is rewritten to use a Platform as a Service (PaaS)
API and distributed using the platform provided by the
cloud vendor. Existing scientific applications tend to be
rather complex, and rewriting one is a tedious task. For
this reason, we require the virtualization approach to retain
compatibility with legacy applications (REQ2). Effectively,
this limits us to employ hypervisor-based virtualization.
In addition to private clouds, we assume that scientific
applications can be executed in a public cloud. Conse-
quently, multi-tenancy becomes an issue. In other words,
the computation, storage and network of different ten-
ants should be isolated properly from each other. In the
extreme case, a public cloud can operate [2] on encrypted
data or be used as a storage for encrypted data [3],
without the cloud vendor ever seeing the unencrypted
data. However, such approaches incur a negative trade-
off with performance and are not a bullet-proof solu-
tion for all cloud privacy issues [4]. In addition, such
approaches are an overkill for our use case with the
data from Large Hadron Collider (LHC), where the data
merely needs to be isolated from the outsiders of the
community. Thus, we require only basic multi-tenancy
support from the underlying cloud platform (REQ3). This
applies to computation, network and storage aspects
occurring internally within a single cloud.
The underlying cloud platform should provide sup-
port for scaling out so that new compute nodes can be
added (or removed) on demand (REQ4). Further, we
assume that the platform supports dynamic transferring
of computation. As the first requirement constrains the
solution space to IaaS, this refers to live migration of VMs
within a single cloud (REQ5). It should be noted that we
do not require live migration support between hybrid
clouds because it is not well supported in any cloud
software, and typically requires custom solutions, but
also both clouds have to run the same hypervisor.
Application level scale-out, fault tolerance and recovery in
the orchestration framework is also required in order to build
a robust service (REQ6). For instance, if one worker node
fails, another one should be assigned to the workload to
complete the processing. We assume also that the users
of the scientific application are authenticated and authorized
in some way (REQ7).
Next, we list a number of requirements related to net-
work communication between individuals VMs. In hy-
brid cloud scenarios, mixing two different cloud deploy-
ments with potentially incompatible IP address names-
paces further requires an “elastic” addressing scheme across
multiple clouds so that VMs remain reachable to each
other (REQ8). These connectivity issues are typically re-
lated to middleboxes (e.g. firewalls blocking connections
and NAT devices with overlapping namespaces), IPv6
address compatibility and maintaining of transport-layer
sessions during address changes [5]. As the connectivity
passes through different, possibly incompatible security
domains in the case of hybrid clouds, we argue that con-
nectivity between individual VMs should be secured (REQ9).
Related to this, a corollary of the first requirement is
that VM-to-VM connectivity and security related to hybrid
clouds should be vendor agnostic (REQ10) in order to avoid
vendor lock-in. Finally, the complex nature of scientific
applications basically mandates that the VM-to-VM con-




Requirements from 1 to 6 are related to the cloud
platforms. Popular open-source (REQ1) cloud platforms
include OpenNebula, OpenStack, CloudStack and Euca-
lyptus [5]. All of them support virtualization of legacy
applications using hypervisors such as KVM (REQ2).
All of the platforms include basic security measures
to support multi-tenant environments (REQ3). Similarly,
basic support for scaling out (REQ4) and live migration
of VMs is supported in all platforms (REQ5). We have
chosen OpenStack for our experiments mostly due to its
familiarity to us, but also its fast adoption rate.
Requirements 6 and 7 are related to the orchestration
frameworks. In the context of this paper, we have to
resort to ARC middleware due to its support in the
CERN experiments. ARC middleware supports appli-
cation level fault tolerance and recovery (REQ6), and
authentication and authorization of the users (REQ7).
Table 1 shows a comparison of popular open-source
solutions for requirements 8 – 11 based on on our earlier
work [6, 7]. The Achilles heel in most of the protocols
is that they fail to support mobility at both ends of
the communication. Hence, the tradional Virtual Private
Network (VPN)-like solutions, OpenVPN, StrongSWAN,
MIPv4 from HP and UMIPv6, can only partially meet
requirement 8 (elastic addressing scheme).
The remaining three protocols meet the criteria for
all requirements. OpenLISP tunnels traffic between two
or more networks based on LISP-capable routers and
has been suggested to be used with virtualized grids in
the context of “Intercloud”-architecture [5], albeit never
actually realized by experimentation. While OpenLISP
is a middlebox-based solution, the remaining two, iPoP
and HIPL, are essentially end-to-end VPNs that require
software installation at the end-hosts.
Software REQ8 REQ9 REQ10 REQ11
OpenVPN (X) X X X
StrongSWAN (X) X X X
MIPv4/HP (X) X X X
UMIPv6 (X) X X X
OpenLISP X X X X
iPoP X X X X
HIPL X X X X
TABLE 1: A comparison of open-source VPNs
Of last three protocols conforming to all requirements,
we were inclined towards HIPL [8] in the production
environment, even though we experimented with some
others in order to compare their performance. Our rea-
soning was as follows: OpenLISP requires support in
middleboxes, which can be problematic from the view-
point of deployment and adoption. In contrast, HIP and
iPoP can be installed only in the VMs that require it. Of
the two remaining ones, the Host Identity Protocol for
Linux (HIPL), has been standardized [1, 9], so we have
chosen it for more extensive experimentation.
4 SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The building blocks of our solution are based on open
source tools. This approach provides access to a vibrant
community with already established ecosystem of tools
and technical know-how. Finally, open source projects
add functionality at a lot faster rate than proprietary
projects.
4.1 OpenStack
OpenStack3 is a open source community effort for an ’In-
frastructure as a Service’ (IaaS), released initially under
the initiative of NASA4 and RackSpace5. As of present,
in its 11th release (Kilo), it features a rich catalogue for
virtualizing different parts of a datacenter infrastructure.
In OpenStack, Nova provides compute services with
support for a number of hypervisors from open source
solutions such as KVM6 or Xen7 to commercial packages
such as VMware8. Swift is the object storage solution
with the ability to manage peta byte storage systems,
while Cinder provides block storage to instances. Glance
is the image repository with interface possibilities to
different storage backends. Keystone is the primary se-
cure access gateway to the cloud. It represents a unified
identity management system handling users, groups and
their permissions across all service offerings. The net-
work is virtualized by Neutron, which allows the tenants
to implement their own virtual networks. Horizon is the
dashboard providing web-based user interface to Open-
Stack services. Heat implements the orchestration engine
for cloud applications infrastructure deployment in an
automated fashion. It has its own template language
but also supports the AWS CloudFormation9 template
format. Ceilometer serves as the metering service for the
deployed OpenStack infrastructure.
4.2 Gluster File System
GlusterFS10 is a distributed file system for building stor-
age solutions that are flexible, automated and adaptive to
growing demands of data. GlusterFS has been designed
to create high level abstractions on top of which stor-
age infrastructures can be build to support new cloud
computing applications or to match specific workload
profiles. GlusterFS is deployed through the concepts of
bricks and translators. Bricks, in their simplest form are
servers attached to the network with a storage element
that when stacked together, can implement the functions
of RAID. The location of data is determined algorithmi-











4.3 Host Identity Protocol
The Host Identity Protocol (HIP) [1, 9] introduces a
cryptographic namespace used to identify end-hosts.
Similarly to Secure Shell (SSH), the identifiers are essen-
tially public keys that are compressed by hashing the
public key. The namespace is compatible with existing
applications by the use of virtual addresses. The names-
pace is managed by a new shim layer between trans-
port and network layers that translates cryptographic
identifiers into routable addresses. The protocol could be
characterized as a VPN, but with the difference that it
works without a gateway. Similarly to many other VPNs,
HIP employs IPsec [10] to authenticate and encrypt
application traffic.
HIP improves three different aspects in the way ap-
plications can address each other. First, it supports
persistent identifiers in the sense that applications use
virtual addresses that remain static despite a virtual
machine using HIP would migrate to another network.
The identifiers also remain consistent even in private
address realms, which makes HIP a suitable solution
for NAT traversal. Second, it supports heterogeneous
addressing with both IPv4 and IPv6 being easily inter-
changeable. Third, the namespace in HIP is a secure
environment with unique identifiers that can not be
forged or ’stolen’. While a number of other protocols
meet these constraints partially, HIP fulfils all three. Due
to space constraints, the comparison of related protocols
cannot be presented here, but is described in full detail
in our earlier work [6, 7].
HIP achieves persistent identifiers by introducing a
new namespace for the transport and application layers
that is decoupled from the network layer addresses. The
identities are managed by a new logical layer between
the transport and network layers that manages the bind-








HIT (or LSI), port and protoApplication Layer
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Fig. 1: HIP decouples the identifiers of the upper layers
from the locators used at the network layer.
The new namespace is based on public-key cryptog-
raphy. According to HIP terminology [9], an abstract
identity is referred to as a Host Identity, whereas a
Host Identifier (HI) refers to the concrete representation
format of the corresponding identity, that is, the public
key of a host. The end-host is responsible for creating the
public key and the corresponding private key for itself.
This way, a HI is self-certifying and statistically unique.
Public keys can be of variable length. Therefore, they
are unsuitable to be used in fixed-length headers for the
HIP control plane, and they are also incompatible with
legacy IPv4 and IPv6 applications. To overcome this, a
HIP-capable host creates two other compressed represen-
tations of the HI. The format for the control plane and
IPv6 applications is the same: the host calculates a hash
over the HI in order to fit it into an IPv6 address and sets
a special prefix for the generated IPv6 address in order to
distinguish it as a virtual address. For IPv4 applications,
the host locally assigns a private IPv4 address, called
a Local-Scope Identifier (LSI), that acts as an alias for
the HI. This way, HIP can support unmodified legacy
IPv4 and IPv6 applications. It should be noted that since
the identifiers in HIP are not routable, the HIP layer
translates them into routable addresses, or locators in
HIP terms. The translation occurs within a new shim
layer located between the transport and network layers.
HIP experiment report [11] describes the use of HIP
with a number of applications. However, report does not
mention anything on scientific applications.
4.4 ARC Middleware
The Advanced Resource Connector (ARC) [12] is a
grid middleware stack developed by the NorduGrid
collaboration11. ARC is widely deployed and used by
research centers and institutes across the Europe and
especially in the Nordic countries. The aim is to provide
a component-based portable, compact and manageable
grid middleware for the community. Along with other
European middleware, ARC is also part of the European
Middleware Initiative (EMI)12 project.
Following are the key components of ARC software
suite:
• HED: Hosting Environment Daemon (HED) is the
web service container specialized for grid related
functionality.
• Computing Element (CE): ARC Resource-coupled
Execution (A-REX) service provides the CE func-
tionality. Other features include the support of
Run Time Environments (RTE), logging capabilities,
support of Local Resource Management Systems
(LRMS) including SLURM13, PBS14, Condor15.
• Information System: ARC resources can be discov-
ered by using Information System Indexing System
(ISIS) web service. ISIS services maintain a peer-to-
peer network in order to provide fault-tolerance and
high availability.
• ARC UI: ARC supports command-line and graph-








• Caching Service: This service is an optional part of
the A-REX service. The aim is to reduce unnecessary
data transfer by caching input data files for the
subsequent jobs.
• Data Management: For data management, ARC
relies on GridFTP server with some customizations.
• Libraries and APIs: ARC provides libraries that
provide certificate handling, resource discovery, bro-
kering and data management functionality.
4.5 CMS Analysis Environment
The Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) collaboration con-
sists of 182 institutes from 42 countries. CMS Monte
Carlo simulation and physics analysis jobs can be sub-
mitted to the resources directly from ARC UI or from
elsewhere in the WLCG16 through EMI or the pilot
workload management systems.
Computing jobs in High Energy Physics (HEP) data
analysis and simulation are relatively simple and se-
quential. These jobs require a well defined and complex
software environment. The base requirement for a CMS
physics computing job in a cloud environment is to be
able to run a correct VM. The VM should contain the
correct runtime libraries and be able to install the correct
analysis software. The method used here is CernVM File
System (CVMFS)17, a scalable software distribution ser-
vice to assist HEP collaborations to deploy their software
on VMs and other grid sites.
4.5.1 CMS Analysis Example
The CMS experiment is a multi-purpose detector to reg-
ister signals from particle collisions at the LHC18 at the
European Organization for Nuclear Reseach (CERN)19.
The recorded data are processed with applications built
within the CMS Software Framework (CMSSW) [13].
Typical CMS data analysis jobs read reconstructed
events that originate either from the particle collisions or
from their simulation. The data is read directly from a
server hosting the data files using the xrootd protocol 20.
The output of an analysis job is either a set of histograms
of quantities of interest, or an interesting subset of the
events in some reduced data format. Usually this is in
the form of ROOT [14–16] objects, for subsequent fast
analysis steps. Analysis jobs have a high I/O load, and
the performance can be limited by it.
The grid jobs are managed with CMS Remote Analysis
Builder (CRAB) [17], a tool developed within the CMS
community to provide a common interface for commu-
nicating with different grid environments. The CRAB
tool also automates the communication to the CMS






and publication of new data files for jobs. A CRAB job
consists of the following elements:
• a shell script setting up the CMSSW job environ-
ment, running the job, possibly copying the output
file to a remote server, and cleaning up;
• CMSSW job configuration file;
• all libraries built on top of a release;
Especially the last item can pose problems in practice if
the set of libraries is large (& 10MB) and the network
bandwidth is limited between the machine where the
grid jobs are submitted and the CE. This occurs because
currently all the information is sent along each ARC job.
5 SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
For our purpose, we have deployed a private cloud
based on OpenStack software suite within the locally
available resources at University of Helsinki, Computer
Science Department21, Finland. For peak hours, we have
utilized ’Pouta’ community IaaS cloud22 from the IT
Center for Science Ltd (CSC)23, Finland. CSC provides
computational, storage and network facilities for re-
search and academic purposes in Finland.
The setup has been designed to run the CMS analysis
framework, originally designed to run on the distributed
infrastructures managed by grid technologies. Therefore,
in order to be the part of the CMS community, we needed
to expose DII-HEP cloud to various job submission and
monitoring interfaces. Supporting the legacy compo-
nents from the grid infrastructure while at the same
time establishing a reliable, scalable and secure cloud
infrastructure, our presented solution can be perceived
as a grid-enabled, cloud-based computing cluster.
Our infrastructure presented in Figure 3, has a multi-
server architecture with a clean separation of duties
between management, computing, networking and stor-
age. The technique we employ is to logically partition the
architecture into multiple tightly interacting tiers. Each
tier represent an abstraction of a resource provided with
the capability to expand and contract upon demand.
In the private cloud, the physical storage tier offers
plain storage Logical Unit Numbers (LUNs) through
10Gbit iSCSI interfaces. We configured two servers as
GlusterFS storage bricks each equipped with 2TB LUNs.
We created a mirrored shared volume where the com-
pute nodes mount to in order to boot the virtual in-
stances. For improved reliability and availability, we
employed separate GlusterFS volumes for the MySQL
database and the virtual machine image repository
(Glance). GlusterFS peering and management is config-
ured from the OpenStack controller as a logical entity
in form of a GlusterFS admin node. The role of the
GlusterFS daemon running in the Gluster admin node





Fig. 2: Overall system architecture of DII-HEP cloud based on Openstack, GlusterFS and Grid tools.
updating, creating and enforcing policies to the volumes
created.
The core cloud tier encompasses the key elements
of the OpenStack suite. The cloud controller pro-
vides resource management and orchestrating activities
by running: nova-api, nova-scheduler, nova-cert, nova-
consoleauth, cinder-scheduler, Keystone, Glance and
Horizon, but also the server instances of RabbitMQ,
MySQL and GlusterFS. In addition to the cloud con-
troller, a network controller manages the network ser-
vices related to IP address management, DNS, DHCP
and security groups through the elements of neutron-
server, neutron-dhcp-agent, and neutron-l3-agent. At a
high level, Neutron displays a very plug-in oriented
architecture. Leveraging the concepts of linux network
namespaces, it provides an isolated virtual networking
stack for each tenant/user with its own network, inter-
faces, and routing tables.
GlusterFS is used as storage backend for running the
block based storage provided by Cinder. Four of our
server instances are configured to run as cinder volume
nodes providing the storage volumes needed by the
CMS analysis software.
The rest of the machines, referred to as Compute
Nodes, run the nova-compute service which interacts
with underlying hypervisor through the libvirt API. Each
compute node has also installed a GlusterFS client that
provides file system services for the unified mount point
where the VMs boot at, and an OpenvSwitch instance
that forwards the network traffic of the VMs running on
the compute nodes.
The virtual environment tier provides the actual appli-
cation infrastructure in the form of virtual instances that
run a Compute Elemenent (CE) and number of Worker
Nodes (WNs). Using the A-REX service provided by the
ARC software stack, the CE manages the authentication
of clients and distribution of jobs to the WNs. To fulfil
the storage requirements of the application tier, the setup
is supported by a GlusterFS distributed storage config-
uration with one admin node and six storage bricks.
The CE is publicly exposed to acquire jobs from the
grid interface. It should be noted that monitoring and
accounting of the available resources is also one of the
integral parts of running a CMS site. The ARC CE runs
the information services that collect and submit site level
information to the publicly available accounting and
monitoring systems.
In our architecture, HIP is used to secure inter-VM
communications with minimal deployment hurdles at
the client side. Despite of how tenants in private clouds
are isolated, we employ HIP mostly to harness its poten-
tial for portable and secure addressing for hybrid clouds.
The proposed architecture allows the application experts
to create HIP enabled secure environments within the
application domain, while securing the computation and
the data. It is worth highlighting that we do not yet
utilize HIP in securing the VM communication with the
storage elements as this remains future work.
OpenStack itself does not provide any built-in moni-
toring tools. Instead, it relies on integrating with other
software that can be customized according to the require-
ments. We employed Graphite24 and the collectd plugin25




performance at three different levels. Level 1 monitors
the CPU usage and the overhead induced by HIP/SSL,
while levels 2 and 3 provide statistics on memory and
network performance.
6 HYBRID CLOUD SETUP
With a hybrid cloud setup, organizations scale out the
local infrastructure (often provided by a private cloud)
by renting resources from publicly available clouds. For
the scientific community, this model is cost efficient
because it allows to start small with locally available
resources and then later to expand temporarily in order
to conduct experiments requiring larger computational
capacity.
In hybrid cloud scenarios, the computational elements
and data need to be exposed to Internet, thus network
security is a major concern. As the tools and frameworks
for cloud security are still maturing, more efforts are re-
quired to provide a comprehensive cloud based solution.
We have herein focused on providing operating system
level security mechanism based on HIP. As a major
benefit no modifications are required at the application
level.
We have prepared customized VM images to support
HIP. The data transfer between the CE and the WNs is
secured by HIP. The details regarding HIP-enabled in-
stances are provided in Section 7. Similar to our DII-HEP
private cloud infrastructure, we have launched several
WNs on the CSC community cloud and connected them
to the CE using HIP.
Fig. 3: Hybrid cloud environment based on DII-HEP and
Pouta Cloud.
Here, it is important to note that our hybrid cloud
solution does not require any extra components or mech-
anisms to manage public resources when compared to
private ones. At present as a limitation, instance initial-
ization at the public cloud is not dynamic but rather
requires manual starting of VMs.
DII-HEP receives jobs coming from different client
submission tools using HTTPS and GridFtp interfaces,
while HIP is not involved at this stage. Once the jobs
have been staged in, the CE further schedules these
jobs to either run on the DII-HEP cloud or CSC cloud
resources. From here onwards, all the communication
is done using HIP that authenticates the CE and WN
using their public keys. In addition it encapsulates the
application payload into a secure IPsec tunnel. Once the
job has been finished, the reverse path is followed to
stage out the results.
Figure 3 illustrates our proposed model for hybrid
clouds that we have also implemented. The solid line
shows the communication channel secured by HTTPS
and the dotted lines represent channels secured using
HIP and IPsec. In our case, CSC cloud was our choice for
scaling out infrastructure, but the current framework can
also utilize resources from any public cloud that serves
the customized VM images.
7 EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
DII-HEP cloud deployment spans over 50 machines
acquired from our private HPC cluster. Each machine
is equipped with eight 2.53 GHz Intel Xeon CPU cores,
32 GB RAM and four 10 Gbit Network Interface Cards
(NICs). The whole physical infrastructure is connected
through Dell PowerConnect M8024 10GbE switches.
With the availability of multiple NICs, we run sep-
arate networks for OpenStack administration, internal
VM traffic and public Internet access. In addition to
these, the machines that provide storage services have
dedicated NICs for iSCSI communication with the stor-
age array. We used Ubuntu 12.04 LTS for running the
OpenStack installation (‘Havana’ version). The Open-
Stack installation uses KVM (Kernel Virtual Machine)
as the underlying virtualization layer. In addition, each
compute node is running an OpenvSwitch26 instance
that facilitates the implementation of virtual network
abstractions by providing connectivity between VMs and
physical interfaces. OpenvSwitch supports traditional
switching techniques including the 802.1Q VLAN, QoS
configurations and tunneling techniques such as generic
routing encapsulation (GRE). In our setup, we employ
GRE tunnels for traffic isolation between tenants.
At the application level, we run a CE virtual instance
with 4 cores and 8 GB RAM. The WNs each have 4
cores, 14 GB RAM, and 40 GB of ephemeral disk space.
GlusterFS provides the storage services, controlled by
the admin node that has 4 cores and 12 GB RAM.
The actual storage consists of six bricks each of which
are equipped with 8 cores, 12 GB RAM and additional
volumes of 500 GB. These bricks are replicated twice
for fault tolerance, and they provide a distributed, but
aggregated shared storage namespace that serves ini-
tially as the staging area for both new and finished
26. http://openvswitch.org
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jobs. The ephemeral disks are configured locally for
WNs that process the grid workloads. The VM images
are relatively light weight (always smaller than 10 GB),
which ensures that the images are rapid to deploy,
terminate and migrate within the private or public cloud
infrastructure. The VMs are based on Scientific Linux 6.4
distribution, with the latest grid software updates from
the CERN repositories.
We use HIP to authenticate and secure the intra and
inter-cloud communication between the CE and the WNs
as highlighted with the dotted lines in Figure 3 and 4.
The IPsec modules required for HIP are supported by the
vanilla Linux kernel since version 2.6.27. At the first run
of the VM, the HIP daemon generates its configuration
files and its Host Identifier (i.e. the private-public key
pair). As the scientific application is IPv6 capable, we
employed HITs instead of the IPv4-compatible LSIs to
enforce HIP-based communication. Only a single ma-
chine, the CE, initiates communication towards the WNs
so we just stored the HIT-to-IP address mappings for
HIP software locally in the /etc/hosts file of CE instead
of utilizing DNS [19] to store this information. It should
be noted that we employed IPv4 as the routable locators
because the used OpenStack version had some IPv6
issues, albeit the IPv6 is more mature in later releases.
Fig. 4: HIP-based communication within the private
DII-HEP cloud.
Facilitating the communication with the outside
world, we expose two interfaces to the end users. The
cloud interface is exposed via the cloud controller, which
offers its service catalog endpoints for resources of com-
pute, storage and networking. Each user with proper
credentials can initiate, modify, or terminate the current
setup accordingly. The grid interface is exposed through
the CE entity. The interface provides all the necessary
software tools required to interface with client-side GRID
APIs. The interfaces and the communication with the
storage elements inside the cloud environment where the
WNs mount to read and write data are exposed through
standard IPv4 features. All our instances are patched
with preconfigured collectd daemon that reports to the
graphite server. This enables us to monitor and collect
performance data for the entire infrastructure.
8 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In order to evaluate the performance and stability of
our infrastructure, we have conducted a series of experi-
ments based on DII-HEP production cloud. The features
of HIP as a protocol has been extensively evaluated and
presented in articles cited in the subsection 4.3. Here
our focus is completely on the application side. The
experiments were conducted using the CMS standard
grid job submission tool (crab) with a typical physics
analysis jobs. The runtime performance of the jobs was
similar to another CMS production site. Currently most
of production sites for CMS analysis run jobs on phys-
ical nodes. Therefore, it is important to determine the
performance degradation caused by a virtualized CMS.
The detailed results concerning the execution in virtual
environment are presented in [20]. We have measured
only 4% CPU degradation by running the HEP-SPEC06
benchmarks using VMs when compared to physical
nodes [20]. This section describes further performance
measurements that compare the overhead of different
security mechanisms on our private cloud. The mea-
surements in the public cloud are omitted due to space
restrictions and similarity with the private cloud results.
High-Performance Computing (HPC) applications have
also been measured in public clouds by others [21–23].
It should be noted that two aspects of OpenStack are
not measured here as others have already published
results. Namely, Yang et al have measured VM migration
performance [24], and Callegati et al have measured
multi-tenancy aspects [25].
8.1 Application Performance Measurements
This section presents the insight of our implemented
architecture in a real world production environment. The
set of jobs submitted to the DII-HEP cloud, model fairly
well the CPU and I/O load of a computationally inten-
sive analysis job in CMS. We submitted and managed
jobs with CRAB using the grid interface as shown in
Figure 4.
Our tests focused on system performance to evalu-
ate the overhead introduced by the HIP-based secu-
rity mechanism. For this, we conducted three similar
tests with three different security settings for the CMS
analysis, each consisting of ten thousand grid jobs. The
first test case uses no specific security mechanism, the
second case uses HIP, and third one uses TLS/SSL based
security. We compared the HIP and TLS/SSL cases with
the insecure case as a baseline. Running a CMS job on
a site requires users to have a valid X.509 certificate.
Therefore the user must be a part of the authorized
virtual organization [26].
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(a) Normal environment (b) HIP environment (c) SSL environment
Fig. 5: CPU utilization of the CE.
(a) Normal environment (b) HIP environment (c) SSL environment
Fig. 6: Network utilization of the CE.
(a) Normal environment (b) HIP environment (c) SSL environment
Fig. 7: Summed CPU utilization of the worker nodes by user and system processes only.
(a) Normal environment (b) HIP environment (c) SSL environment
Fig. 8: Summed Network utilization of the worker nodes.
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Application level grid security modules impose this
requirement in validating the incoming jobs, thus it is
introduced as additional security measure in all the
three test cases. In all three test cases, each grid job
is autonomous and requires a serial execution of ap-
proximately 170 minutes. Each test case was running
approximately for one week. The complete life cycle of a
job includes submission, execution and data staging. The
jobs are CPU bound, and require access to parts of the
event data organized as files on the common storage sites
using the xrootd protocol. The success rate in all three test
cases is greater than 99%, with some jobs failing due to
data staging issues. All three test cases were executed by
a cluster of 50 WNs, each equipped with four cores. In
the grid execution environment, each core at a WN was
configured as a single job execution slot. In total, 50 WNs
contributed 200 slots for parallel job execution. Also,
each slot can consume up to 1 GB of resident memory.
Fig. 9: Utilization of a single core in a worker node.
Figure 9 illustrates the utilization pattern of a single-
core CPU in a WN. We have used the baseline (no HIP
or TLS/SSL security) test case to generate this plot. The
X-axis shows number of days the test was running and
the Y-axis the CPU utilization in percentage. The CPU
activity shown by the CPU-user is based on the per-
centage of the user processes, e.g.applications, whereas
CPU-nice reflects the percentage of CPU occupied by the
user processes (applications) with positive nice value.
Since the WNs are dedicated to run the CMS jobs, the
single-core execution shows that the CPU core is mostly
occupied by the CMS jobs. The CPU utilization by the
remaining processes is negligible in comparison to the
CMS job processes. We observed a similar pattern while
running the other two test cases. It is worth noting that
the green line (CPU-nice) dips 50 times, each signifying
a separate job running for roughly the same time. The
same trend occurs also in all three test cases.
Figures 5, 6, 7 and 8 show the CPU utilization and
network traffic of the CE and WNs in the three test
cases. In each figure, the first subfigure shows the system
performance without security, the second one illustrates
the HIP case and the third one shows the TLS/SSL case.
It is worth noting that the scale in the TLS/SSL case is
different due to occasional peaks. The plots in Figure 5
show that the overall CPU load in each of the three test
cases is less than 20% at the CE. All three cases also ex-
perience a very similar performance overhead except for
a few peaks in the SSL case. This shows that including
HIP-based security creates negligible CPU overhead at
the CE. The same behavior can also be observed in the
network performance as shown in Figure 6. Figures 7
and 8 show the summed CPU and network usage for
the 50 WNs. Here it is worth noting that SSL operates in
the user space whereas IPsec operates in the kernel. All
three cases incur similar performance overhead, and we
have also excluded CPU-nice in Figure 7 for improved
clarity.
The overhead of network security appears to be rel-
atively small with the workloads we have used in our
experiments. The reason for this is that the workloads are
not network intensive, and thus security is not the main
bottleneck. In next section, we stress test the network
with different security solutions.
8.2 Network Performance Comparison
We measured raw TCP throughput and network latency
(ICMP round-trip time, RTT) using different security
protocols installed on the VMs. For these measurements,
we used hardware different from the other measure-
ments; the rack servers consisted of HP Proliant BL280c
server (2 Intel Xeon CPU E5640 2.67Ghz, 64 GB of mem-
ory) with Gigabit ethernet interfaces. The OpenStack
release was Grizzly, and Ubuntu 12.04 was used in the

























































Fig. 10: Network throughput and latency.
As the base case, plain unsecured IPv4 connectivity
(marked with “Ipv4”) displays best performance as it has
the highest throughput (417.4 Mbit/s) and smallest la-
tency (0.8 ms). For HIP measurements, we employed HIP
for Linux v1.0.7. HIP was measured with different com-
binations of application layer identifiers (LSIs vs. HITs)
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and network layer locators (IPv4 vs. IPv6 vs. Teredo), of
which HITs combined with IPv4 based locators offered
the best performance. This measurement result will be
used for comparing with other VPNs (StrongSWAN
v5.0.4, OpenVPN v2.2.1, iPoP v9.6.1) because the same
HIP configuration was used in the grid measurements.
In network throughput, StrongSWAN offered the best
performance (151.5 Mbit/s). OpenVPN (124.7 Mbit/s)
and HIP (121.5 Mbit/s) offered very similar perfor-
mance. iPoP displayed the worst performance (49.0
Mbit/s).
In network latency, StrongSWAN dominated again (0.8
ms), but HIP came second (0.9 ms) and then iPoP (1.1
ms). The worst performance occurred with OpenVPN
(1.2 ms).
To generalize, VPN-based security introduces a large
performance penalty to the throughput, but smaller
impact to the latency. In other words, VPN-based secu-
rity should be avoided in high-throughput applications
when performance is critical. Of the four compared
VPNs, the chosen protocol, HIP, offers “medium” per-
formance.
9 A STRAW-MAN SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we review some of the security properties
of the components based on the categorization of the
classic Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA)
information security model [27].
9.1 Confidentiality and Integrity
In our specific use case, the data is not highly sensitive.
The entire CMS community can have read access to the
CMS data and write back the computed results. It is
enough to keep outsiders outside, and we have no need
for multiple access levels to different types of data. At the
application level, virtual organization is enough to keep
outsiders out. However, the multi-tenant environment as
introduced by public clouds requires additional isolation
mechanisms below the application layer. Within a single
cloud, the cloud vendor should employ hypervisors to
guarantee confidentiality and integrity protection for
virtualized applications and their data. In our case, we
employed the KVM hypervisor. When the data is being
moved within a single cloud, vendor specific isolation
guarantees, such GRE tunnels in the case of our Open-
Stack deployment, can be used as a security measure.
Finally, we proposed to use tenant-specific measures
to secure hybrid cloud scenarios in order to support
“portable” and vendor-agnostic security. More specifi-
cally, we employed HIP-based VPN connectivity directly
between virtual machines in our deployment to provide
authenticity, integrity and confidentially protection using
IPSec.
It is worth noting that our threat model assumes that
a public cloud vendor does not maliciously compromise
credentials related to the virtual organization, OpenStack
authentication or even the private keys used for HIP. We
believe this is not an unreasonable assumption because
such operations would hurt economically the public
cloud vendor in the long run, and needs to be agreed
clearly in the service-level agreement with the vendor.
9.2 Availability
The ARC application we have employed supports fault-
tolerance and recovery against benign problems, such as
programming errors in the grid application or hardware
failures. In such events, the CE can resubmit jobs to
working WNs. While the system supports multiple CEs
possibly even sharing WNs, the CE itself is the entrance
point into the system and thus could be considered
as the weakest link of the scientific application due to
non-distributed nature. Fortunately, mounting, e.g., a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack to a CE
outside of the cloud can be difficult due to two levels
of network security, i.e., HIP tunnels transported inside
OpenStack GRE tunnels.
A small private cloud deployment could still become
a victim of a DDoS attack. In such a case, scaling out to
a public cloud would make mounting such an attack
harder due to larger attack surface, especially if the
public cloud vendor operates on multiple continents.
10 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
We have virtualized a fairly complex scientific appli-
cation with KVM and OpenStack. As the application
is virtualized to run in the cloud, it is easier to de-
ploy and scale out especially in public clouds. Private
clouds are still of equal importance especially when
dealing privacy-sensitive data. Mixing of private and
public clouds in the form of hybrid clouds is becoming
relevant; some organizations start with small private
clouds, and scale out temporarily to public clouds to
handle peak loads. However, hybrid cloud scenarios
require additional mechanisms to deal with network
topology changes and security. As a solution, we propose
to use the Host Identity Protocol (HIP) for scientific
applications operated in hybrid clouds.
Our network performance measurements show that
HIP offers comparable performance to other three VPN
technologies with some variations. In general, all four
VPN technologies introduce a large network perfor-
mance penalty on throughput when compared to in-
secure communications, but the impact on latency is
negligible. Next, we measured and compared secured
versions of the scientific application with a non-secured
one. The results show that SSL/TLS or HIP as a secu-
rity measure do not drastically impact the performance
footprint in production environment. At first, this seems
counter-intuitive because the pure network performance
of TCP/IP degrades a roughly factor of five for through-
put and a factor of two for latency when HIP is used in
the OpenStack network. However, the unexpectedly low
impact of the extra security in the production environ-
ment can be explained by the relatively low volumes
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of network traffic in the grid. In environments with
multiple tenants running workloads simultaneously, the
additional security measures can have more impact.
While others have measured the impact of multi-tenancy
with OpenStack [25], this remains further work with our
use case and application. We should also note that per-
formance impact of HIP is a trade-off towards secured,
vendor-agnostic and topology-independent addressing.
For the future, we are aiming to make our cloud
more resilient, elastic and manageable at large scale
without compromising security. For this we are currently
proceeding in three directions. Firstly, we are working
on dynamic provisioning of resources in hybrid cloud
environments. Secondly, the live VM migration support
in OpenStack has been improving over the time, and
we would like to measure it using different mobility
management schemes, albeit cross-domain migration ap-
pears still challenging. Thirdly, light-weight containers,
such as those popularized by Docker, offer faster boot-
up time for virtual machines, which we could employ to
accommodate peak loads faster in scientific applications.
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